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Abstract—OAuth 2.0 is a framework for authorization. 
Being a framework, OAuth 2.0 allows extensions to build on 
top of it. OpenID Connect is one such extension which adds 
authentication layer using identity details. OAuth 2.0 define 
several roles that are required to complete the protocol. Both 
OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect involve interactions between 
these roles. These interactions require a pre-established trust 
or a trust establishment while protocol operate. This paper 
analyzes trust establishments between OAuth 2.0 roles and 
discuss important aspects of them. Such analysis is required 
for proper understanding of the protocols. 
Keywords—OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect, trust establishment, 
security 
I. INTRODUCTION 
OAuth 2.0 is a protocol identified through RFC6749 and 
titled The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [1]. It 
obsoletes its predecessor, OAuth 1.0 which is identified 
through RFC5849 titled The OAuth 1.0 Protocol [2]. OAuth 
2.0 protocol define a process to allow an application to 
access a resource owned by a human user. Presence of a 
human user is not mandatory in this process. Protocol define 
ways to allow application itself to obtain access grants to 
protected resources [1]. Regardless of these differences, 
primary goal of OAuth 2.0 is to authorize a third-party to 
access protected resources [1]. 
When it comes to OpenID Connect, involvement of a 
human user becomes mandatory [3]. This is because of the 
identity layer protocol introduces. These identity information 
are transferred through a JSON Web token (JWT)[4]. 
Formally this token is identifying as ID Token. The 
authentication mechanism is built on this identity layer [3] 
[5]. Hence OpenID Connect is built as an extension to 
OAuth 2.0, it inherits same set of roles and their interactions. 
This work no means try to define what is meant by trust. 
But whenever the word trust is used, it refers to a mutual 
understanding between two entities (OAuth 2.0 roles). Next 
section formally introduces roles involved in the protocols. 
Section after that briefly review Oauth2.0 and OpenID 
Connect protocols. This review helps to identify interactions 
between roles. Finally, paper present trust establishments 
among interacting roles. 
II. FORMAL INTRODUCTION TO ROLES 
OAuth 2.0 defines four main roles [1] [6]. Protocol 
involves interactions between these roles to obtain 
authentication and related tokens. Understanding the purpose 
of these roles is essential to evaluate trust among them. Also, 
it will help to understand how protocol works. 
“TABLE I” formally introduce these roles and describe their 
purpose. Role names are same as the ones defined by the 
OAuth 2.0 protocol [1]. Descriptions also closely follow 
what protocol defines but contains additional details that are 
gathered from various resources. 
TABLE I. OAUTH 2.0 ROLES 
 
OAuth 2.0 role Description 
Resource owner 
An entity which owns a resource 
stored/hosted in a remote location. 
This entity can be a human user or 
non-human. According to OAuth 2.0, 
when resource owner is a human, this 
entity will be referred as an end-user. 
For OpenID Connect, resource owner 
must be an end-user 
Resource server 
An entity which store/host resources 
owned by resource owners. Granting 
access to its resources is done by 
accepting OAuth 2.0 tokens. These 
tokens are formally identified as access 
tokens 
Client 
This is an application which expect to 
obtain permission to access resources 
from a resource server. Permission is 
grant to this application by the 
resource owner. Application prove this 
permission to resource server through 
the possession of an access token 
Authorization 
server 
A central server which can issue valid 
tokens to a client application. Token 
are issued only if resource owner 
permits to do so. Depending on the 
protocol, issued tokens will vary. A 
single authorization server can server 
multiple clients. 
 
OAuth 2.0 specification does not mandate resource server 
and authorization server to exist separately [1]. They can co-
exist in a single system [1]. Yet, role definitions will not 
change and will have the same impact. 
From OpenID Connect point of view, all above 
mentioned roles exist in the protocol. But the role of resource 
owner has a specialization. As highlighted before, OpenID 
Connect introduce an identity layer for authentication 
purpose [3] [5]. This require resource owner to be a human 
user. Specification define this human user as end-user. This 
resembles well with OAuth 2.0 definition of end-user. 
With the understanding about roles, it is now possible to look 
at how these roles are involved in mentioned protocols. This 
understating is required to identify trust establishments. 
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III. UNDERSTANDING PROTOCOLS 
Primary purpose of OAuth 2.0 protocol is to obtain 
access permission to a protected resource [1] [7] [8]. In this 
process, access token acts as credentials to resources from 
resource server [1]. “Fig.1” shows the abstract representation 
of OAuth 2.0 protocol in a sequential diagram. It shows the 
process involved in obtaining access tokens and retrieving 
resources from resource server. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Client initiate the protocol by requesting access grants 
from authorization server. Authorization server ones 
validated this request, obtain authorization grants from 
resource owner. If authorization grants presented are 
accepted, authorization server response with tokens after a 
client authentication. Ones tokens are obtained, client can 
access resources from resource server. Resource server will 
validate the resource request against received access token. If 
access token is valid, resource server will response with the 
requested resource. 
While above description shows the abstract version of the 
protocol, there exist several variations of it. Mostly these 
variations exist in the way which resource owner grants are 
obtained [1]. OAuth 2.0 define four mechanisms to obtain 
authorization grants [1]. They are as below, 
• Authorization code grant 
• Implicit grant 
• Resource owner password credentials grant 
• Client credentials grant 
As stated in the specification, best way of obtaining 
authorization grant is by resource owner direct interaction 
with authorization server [1]. This is the scenario highlighted 
in “Fig. 1” and defined by authorization code grant.  
A key highlight is the client credential grant. This grant 
allows a client directly to authorize against the resource 
server without the presence of a resource owner. In this grant 
type, credentials hold by a client is accepted as authorization 
grant [1] [8]. Thus, client itself act as the resource owner. 
OpenID Connect behave similar to what is depicted by 
abstract flow in “Fig. 1”. The addition occurs in the token 
response. With OpenID Connect, token response contains the 
ID Token. Client validate the ID Token by following 
protocol defined validation steps. If valid, client authenticate 
the end-user identified through claims present in the ID 
Token [3]. In comparison to OpenID Connect, OAuth 2.0 
doesn’t provide a way to retrieve end user information. 
Furthermore, OpenID Connect define three main flows to 
obtain tokens [3]. They resemble to grant types defined by 
OAuth 2.0, merely defining ways to obtain authorization 
grants and present them to authorization server. 
If authorization grant obtaining is neglected, it is possible 
to represent OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect protocols 
collectively by “Fig. 2”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step A represents the client interaction with authorization 
server to obtain access grants. Step B represent obtaining 
authorization grant from resource owner and authentication 
of end user. Authentication is applicable only for OpenID 
Connect. Also, this step is only present when protocol 
involves a resource owner. Step C represents client obtaining 
resources from resource server using access grants. 
This representation helps to visualize trust boundaries of 
the protocols. For example, resource owner and client require 
interactions, thus require a trust establishment. Same can be 
seen for client and authorization server. Also, client and 
resource serer interact and require a trust establishment. Next 
section will explore more details on this. 
IV.  ROLE OF TRUST 
As shown in “Fig. 2”, there are three main steps involved 
in OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect protocols. These steps 
occur between roles introduced through “TABLE I”. 
Mentioned steps require set of validations to succeed to 
complete a protocol. One such example is validation of 
authorization grant exchanged in step A. These validations 
require trust among different OAuth 2.0 roles. In the 
following sections, five trust establishments are discussed.  
First trust establishment exists between resource owner 
and client. OAuth 2.0 protocol allows resource owner to 
delegate access rights to client application [1] [9]. To 
perform this access delegation, resource owner must trust the 
client.  
OAuth2 provides a way to control and monitor what 
client can perform with access grants obtained through this 
trust relationship. When granting authorization, authorization 
server has the option to obtain consent from end user [10]. 
End user can reduce access levels or totally reject consent 
during this step [10]. 
Resource Owner Client Authorization server
Response with tokens
Request resources with token
Response with resource
Request authorization grants
Provide authorization grants
Request access grants
Resource server
 
Fig. 1. Abstract flow of OAuth 2.0 protocol 
Resource Owner Client
Authorization server
Resource server
A
C
B
 
Fig. 2. Abstract representation of protocols 
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Resource Owner Client
 
 
But not all grant types can present the consent obtaining 
step. Resource owner password credential grant require 
resource owner to share their credentials with client [1]. As 
defined by the OAuth 2.0 protocol, this requires a trust 
relationship between resource owner and client [1]. So, it is 
clear that this trust establishment occur outside the protocols, 
prior to using them. 
OpenID Connect extends this trust relationship from 
client to resource owner. Authentication based on ID Token 
allows client to identify and validate the end user involved in 
authorization grant. Thus, trust relationship expands in both 
directions. 
Second trust establishment exist between client and 
authorization server. This trust establishment is done through 
OAuth 2.0 defined client registration step [1]. According to 
protocol, this must be performed prior to using the protocol. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Client registration establish the trust between client and 
authorization server. Registered clients receive a client 
identifier [1] and in special cases a password [1]. OAuth 2.0 
protocol define the latter to be a confidential client [1]. Client 
credentials are a key component of the protocol. Client 
present these credentials (client identifier and password if 
issued) to authenticate itself when requesting tokens from 
authorization server [1]. Protocol mandate authorization 
server to validate client credentials when token request 
arrives. 
Exception for this is when using resource owner 
password grant. This grant allows client to obtain tokens 
without client credentials [1]. In this grant type, authorization 
server establish trust with client through resource owner 
credentials. In this special case, trust establishment could 
occur dynamically, at the time client contact authorization 
server. 
Third trust establishment exist between client and 
resource server. First two trust relationships allow client to 
obtain access token from authorization server. Once an 
access token is received, client use this token to request 
resources from resource server. RFC6750 defines how an 
access token can be embedded in such a resource request 
[11]. 
Client Resource server
 
 
Once resource server receives an access token, it must 
validate the token [1]. OAuth 2.0 protocol does not define 
how this validation needs to be done. But it suggests that 
token expiration and token scope verification as key 
validation tasks. Hence OAuth 2.0 does not enforce the 
structure of access token, some solutions use JWT structure 
for access token [12] [13]. This allows resource server to 
validate contents present in JWT, thus granting access to 
resources. Another approach is to use OAuth 2.0 token 
introspection protocol [12]. This require resource server to 
communicate with authorization server. Regardless of the 
method used, this shows the requirement of a fourth trust 
establishment to complete the token validation. 
Fourth trust establishment exist between authorization 
server and resource server. This trust relationship is essential 
to validate the access token. When access request reaches the 
resource server, it must validate the request to contain a valid 
access token. This validation requires resource server to trust 
access tokens issued by the authorization server [1] [9]. Also, 
token validation requires resource server to verify token 
against authorization server. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Access token validation will differ by the format of the 
token. When using JWT access tokens, token validation will 
require JWT signature verification. This require resource 
server to access authorization server’s token signing 
certificate details. These details can be dynamically obtains 
through authorization server configuration endpoint [14] 
[15]. Or else they can be shared when trust establishment 
occur. 
Also, if resource server use token introspection endpoint 
to validate the access token, then resource server must 
authenticate itself against authorization server [12]. This 
further strengthen the requirement of trust between 
authorization server and resource server. Furthermore, 
without this trust establishment, trust relationship among 
client and resource server won’t be complete. This shows the 
inter-dependency between third and fourth trust 
relationships. 
There exist a fifth trust establishment between resource 
owner and authorization server. This trust relationship is not 
so obvious but is requires when protocol involves a resource 
owner. In the process of issuing access grants, resource 
server must validate the provided authorization grant. OAuth 
 
Fig. 3. Trust between resource owner and client 
Client Authorization server
 
Fig. 4. Trust between client and authorization server 
Fig. 5. Trust between client and resource server 
Resource serverAuthorization server
 
Fig. 6. Trust between authorization server and resource server 
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2.0 does not mandate this to be a credential-based 
authentication step. But in most implementations, this step 
involves username, password credentials. Credential 
information obtaining, and sharing is out of scope of the 
protocols. Hence this step needs to be done prior to using the 
protocol. 
Resource Owner Authorization server
 
 
Even when authorization grant validation does not 
involve username, password credentials, grant validation will 
require a pre-established trust. Protocol cannot operate 
without this trust. 
Given above are the five trust establishments involved 
with OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect. As described, they are 
required for protocol operations. “TABLE II” summaries 
them and present their key-highlights. 
TABLE II. SUMMARY OF TRUST RELATIONSHIPS 
 
Trust 
Relationship 
Key highlights 
Resource owner 
& Client 
• No specific trust establishment 
method defined by protocols 
• Must be established prior to using 
the protocols 
• Not present in some OAuth 2.0 
grant types which does not include a 
resource owner 
Client & 
Authorization 
server 
• Established through a registration 
step or can be done dynamically in 
special cases  
• Client credentials are used to prove 
this trust 
• Credentials include a client 
identifier and in some cases a 
password 
• Resource owner password 
credentials grant does not require 
this to present prior to using OAuth 
2.0 protocol 
Client & 
Resource server 
• Established solely on top of access 
token 
• Trust establishment depends on trust 
establishment between resource 
server and authorization server 
Resource server 
& Authorization 
server 
• Established dynamically (when 
using protocols) or in some cases 
must be established before using 
protocols  
• Required for access token validation 
• Trust establishment can be done 
through OAuth 2.0 and OpenID 
Connect public configuration 
endpoints 
• Trust establishment can be done 
through a registration process 
V. CONCLUSION 
This work present trust establishments in OAuth 2.0 and 
OpenID Connect protocols. It formally introduces the roles 
involved in mentioned protocols. Then it presents how 
protocol operate, showing interactions between roles. Then it 
unravels trust establishments required for identified 
interactions among roles. Finally, a summary is given with 
key highlights on trust establishment. 
This work is present as a review on existing knowledge. 
It involves in-depth analysis of OAuth 2.0 and OpenID 
Connect. One can use this knowledge to understand 
mentioned protocols. Also, protocol implementations can 
refer this knowledge to take design and implementation 
decisions. Furthermore, knowledge present here on trust 
establishment can use to propose extensions on OAuth 2.0 
and OpenID Connect. 
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